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Introduction  
The transnational dimension ascribed to may phenomena traditionally associated with 
domestic, or internal, security such as terrorism, drug trafficking, pandemics, or people 
smuggling has led to increased pressures to increase cooperation across national borders to 
‘fight’ or ‘manage’ many of the new, transnational security threats. The ESS describes the 
post-Cold War environment as ‘one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and 
external aspects of security are indissolubly linked’ (European Union 2003b, 3). The 
perceived diffusion between internal and external security has not only accelerated demands 
for a greater cooperation between the EU and third states and international organizations, but 
also provided the EU with greater policy-making competencies. Subsequently the EU has 
over the last decade or so established policies in a number of different policy fields which 
seek to guide the behavior of its member states within the EU, as well as the EU’s external 
cooperation.1  
 
                                                 
1 In the field of human trafficking for example these include the EU Strategy towards the Eradication of 
Trafficking in Human Beings (2012-2016), 2011 Directive on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings and Protecting its Victims (2011/36), Directive on Temporary Residence Permits for Victims of 
Trafficking in Human Beings (2004/81/EC), and Action Oriented Paper (AOP) on strengthening the EU external 
dimension on combating trafficking in human beings. 
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With regard to the latter the EU has sought to promote its own norms and ideas, policy 
preferences and its own model of regional integration in her external affairs. This has most 
commonly become associated with the EU’s so-called rights-based approach in counter 
terrorism, as well as the EU’s human security focus in fighting human trafficking.2 Against 
this background, the externalization of the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) has evolved 
into an emerging policy arena and a field of study. Whereas the EU’s role initially was 
regarded by various analysts as a “paper tiger” (Bures 2006), a number of recent studies have 
examined the growing potency of the EU to actively promote ideas and policy preferences in 
its neighborhood as well as with the U.S. (Kaunert and Léonard 2011; Kaunert 2009; Wolff, 
Wichmann, and Mounier 2009; Mounier 2007). Scant attention, however, has been paid to the 
EU’s role in other parts of the world. Especially research on the EU’s cooperation with what 
has arguably emerged as the second most successful regional organization after the EU, 
ASEAN, in policy fields related to JHA is almost non-existent (Chevallier-Govers 2012; 
Maier-Kapp 2012).  
 
By closely examining the EU’s cooperation with ASEAN in two policy fields deemed central 
within JHA – human trafficking and counter terrorism – seeks not only to broaden the 
empirical basis of scholarship, but additionally seeks to connect the empirical findings with 
the wider debates on the EU’s ability to externalize its internal security governance to third 
states and other regional organizations. Both, terrorism and human trafficking, have a strong 
regional and international dimension to it. The fight against terrorism and human trafficking is 
therefore not only fought at the national level, but also on the regional and international level 
(Broadhurst und Le 2013; Abuza 2003; Ramakrishna und Tan 2003; Lee 2013). Given that, 
with the Lisbon Treaty and the ASEAN Charter, both regional organizations gained legal 
personality granting them legal capacity and the powers to act in international affairs, EU-
                                                 
2 See for example EU Directive 36/2011 on human trafficking.  
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ASEAN cooperation in policy fields often associated with so-called non-traditional security 
also makes for an interesting case study of how the EU conducts inter-regional affairs. The 
paper builds on earlier research of mine, which found that despite numerous declarations and 
plan of actions, very little policy transfer has actually taken place between the EU and 
ASEAN (Heiduk 2014). The earlier research, however, made very little contribution in terms 
of explaining this observation. It is all the more puzzling as the EU repeatedly has often been 
ascribed to be a “model” for regional integration processes in other parts of the world. At 
least, in the words of former ASEAN General Secretary Ong Keng Yong, the EU is viewed as 
a provider of ideas and best practices: “The very nature of ASEAN as an intergovernmental 
organization differs from that of the EU. However, we are looking for good ideas and best 
practices, and the European Union certainly has plenty of these.” 3 More specifically, 
instances such as the modeling of ASEAN’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) 
on the EU’s Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) have thrown up questions on 
institutional mimesis regarding ASEAN (Murray und Moxon-Browne 2013). Hence this paper 
poses the question: How can we explain the observation that, despite strong rhetorical impetus 
for deeper EU-ASEAN cooperation, there has been little to no externalization or policy 
transfer in the field of JHA?  
 
Established scholarship in the field of EU Studies has traditionally been inward-looking when 
seeking to explain failure of the EU to externalize its own policy preferences, i.e. by blaming 
low levels of Europeanization and weak regional institutions in Brussels. Europe’s own inter-
governmentalism in most areas related to JHA and the lack of powerful institutions, i.e. a 
“European FBI”, at the regional level are common explanatory factors. This paper, based on 
newer approaches in the wider policy transfer literature, argues that we have to turn our 
                                                 
3 http://www.asean.org/resources/2012-02-10-08-47-56/speeches-statements-of-the-former-secretaries-general-
of-asean/item/forty-years-of-asean-can-the-european-union-be-a-model-for-asia 
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analytical focus away from what is assumed to be the ‘policy innovator’ (the EU) and towards 
the supposed ‘policy taker’ (in our case ASEAN) to be able to give a more rounded answer to 
the question. With regard to the case under study any potential externalization or transfer of 
policy from the Europe to Southeast Asia does not take place against some sort of terra 
nullius. By tracing the development of regional policies in the aforementioned two policy 
fields within Southeast Asia the paper finds any attempt to externalize or transfer policy is 
met by long-standing ideas and norms, policy paradigms and an established specific modus 
operandi of regional cooperation. It is the so-called ASEAN-way, which, I argue, will 
continue to make nigh impossible any externalization of EU policies to Southeast Asia for the 
foreseeable future. More so, if anything it has been ASEAN, not the EU, which successfully 
managed to externalize its very own norms and its modus operandi into its external relations 
with the EU in the field of JHA.  
 
Policy externalization, transfer and translation 
There has been a burgeoning academic debate during the last decade on the externalization of 
EU policies, hereby understood as attempts “to transfer the EU’s rules and policies to third 
countries and international organisations” (Lavenex und Schimmelfennig 2009, 791), in 
recent years. The available literature draws heavily on historical institutionalism and can be, 
for the sake of clarity and at the same time at the risk of over-generalization, divided into four  
broad sets of factors that have been used to explain the externalization of EU norms and 
policies (or the lack thereof). The first set of factors (‘degree of europeanization’) claims that 
the modes and the impact of externalization is primarily shaped by the EU’s internal modes of 
governance. Essentially the argument hereby is that the degree of Europeanization in any 
given policy field has a strong impact on the scope and depth of the externalization of said 
policies beyond the EU’s borders (Keohane 2008, 129; Monar 2007). The higher the degree 
of Europeanization the more the EU is able to externalize its policy preferences in any given 
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policy field. For example, initial works on EU-U.S. counter terrorism cooperation viewed the 
low levels of Europeanization in counter terrorism affairs as a hindrance to closer transatlantic 
cooperation (Rees 2006, 4).  
 
A second strand of research claims that the power resources the EU holds vis-à-vis third states 
and other actors (‘relative distribution of power’) are the main explanatory factor when trying 
to understand externalization processes. Accordingly, it is the ability of the EU to ensure third 
country compliance with its own rules and policy preferences through the pressuring medium 
of future accession which has been viewed as the main explanatory factor. This has been 
framed as the EU’s ‘governance by conditionality’ approach, whereby the EU is able, with 
respect to its enlargement, to make compliance with its own rules and policies (laid out in the 
Copenhagen criteria) and adopting the acquis communautaire a condition candidate countries 
have to fulfil to become EU members (Schimmelfennig und Sedelmeier 2004). Similarly, in 
order to be able to gain market access, firms often need to adopt EU rules and product 
standards. Hence this second strand of research argues that externalization is most likely to 
take place when the EU is in possession of superior relative bargaining power which it then 
uses as a coercive mechanism to transfer its own norms and policies to third states. A third set 
of factors highlights the degree of institutional similarities between the EU, as well as its 
member states, and those of third states. Accordingly, the more the domestic structures and 
practices of other actors resemble those of the EU, the more likely a successful externalization 
becomes (Shapiro/ Byman 2006).  
 
While the aforementioned sets of factors produce different explanations for the EU’s ability to 
externalize its internal security interests (or the lack thereof), they all conceive of 
externalization as a hierarchical, coercive mode of governance. Noticing that the EU’s 
dominant modus operandi in the field of security policy is transgovernmental rather than 
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Europeanized, with Brussels playing largely a coordinating function as security policy is by 
and large perceived as the domaine reserve of the member states (Wong 2011), Lavenex and 
Wichmann (2009, 85) conceived a different, horizontal mode of externalization – that of 
externalization through networks. They differentiate between three network types: a) 
information networks, which are set up to diffuse ideas and policy-relevant knowledge and to 
identify best practices; b) implementation networks, which focus on enhancing cooperation 
among institutions to enable the implementation of existing norms and rules – this takes 
usually place through capacity building measures and technical assistance; and c) regulating 
networks, which have the strongest impact on third states as they are based on a legislative 
mandate to enforce rules and standards in a specific policy field. Despite their differences, all 
network types are similar in that they are non-hierarchical and voluntarily; they are 
established between formally equal partners (Lavenex und Wichmann 2009, 86).  
 
While the distinction between vertical and horizontal modes of the externalization of EU 
policies is important to incorporate coercive and voluntary forms, it tells us very little about 
the process of externalization itself. For example it is not clear whether externalization 
through governance networks can be assumed to be more successful than externalization 
through more vertical modes (or vice versa). More so, they conceive of the transfer of policies 
in a linear fashion as a sequential, quasi-mechanistic process, whereby the externalization 
starts with policy innovation by the EU and / or its member states and ends with the adoption 
of certain ideas and policies by a third country. Coming from there the existing literature is 
rather heavy on the descriptive end in that it describes the transfer of ideas and best practices 
via different governance modes, ‘but does not analyze and explain the processes involved’ 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 7). It furthermore appears to be inward-looking in the sense that 
policy innovation is assumed to take place in the EU and its subsequently externalized 
elsewhere. Notwithstanding the (at least theoretical) possibility of such a linear transfer of 
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ideas or polices actually materializing, it indirectly closes the door (theoretically speaking) on 
the agency of the policy taker (in our case ASEAN) with regard to his ability to engage in 
policy translation, interpretation or modification during the process and its effects on the ideas 
or the policy itself. ‘Factors that are internal to a system such as the power dynamics of 
political interests and socio-historical make-up of a polity can be a more powerful determinant 
of what is adopted more so  than external factors’ (Stone 2012, 485).  
 
In an effort to at least partially amend these blind spots discovered in the externalization 
literature, we turn to the rather big and multidisciplinary chunk of literature on “policy 
transfer” and “policy translation” which has benefitted from contributions from diverse fields 
of study such as Public Policy, Geography and Health. A widely used definition defines 
“policy transfer” as “a process by which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in one political system (past or present) is used in the development of 
policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political system’ 
(Dolowitz and Marsh 2000, 5). In an attempt to unpack the process, the ‘act of transfer’ 
(Benson und Jordan 2011, 373), special attention was given to questions revolving around the 
main actors engaged in the transfer of policies; their motivations; the main elements of the 
transfer (ideas, policy goals, institutions, personnel or regulatory instruments) (Beeson and 
Stone 2013); the timing of the transfer (i.e. during a time of crisis); institutional constraints; as 
well as the wider contextual factors (socio-historic, political, economic) (Dolowitz and Marsh 
2000).  
 
Studies also attempted to link modes of transfer with the specific transfer processes: Whereas 
policy emulation or the copying of a policy typically occurs under coercive transfer modes 
(i.e. as part of Europeanisation processes), softer, voluntary transfer modes typically lend 
themselves to ‘softer’ processes of policy imitation or policy inspiration (Benson and Jordan 
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2011, 371). On the basis of empirical observations which suggest that policy transfer outside 
the EU rarely, if ever, result in complete (in the affirmative sense: “successful”) transfer of a 
policy, we can also find an intensive discussion of the factors constraining policy transfer in 
the literature. In relation to the transfer process four broad types of constraints have been 
identified: demand side constraints (unwillingness to move beyond the status quo, policy 
resistance by entrenched interests); programmatic constraints (uniqueness of policies and their 
jurisdiction); contextual constraints (ideological, institutional or cultural incompatibilities); 
and application constraints (high transaction costs of policy modifications and institutional 
adjustments) (Benson und Jordan 2011, 372). Coming from there policy transfers more often 
than not do not lead to convergence. While convergence with regard to broad policy 
objectives is often the case, divergence frequently occurs with regard to the instruments 
adopted for policy implementation. ‘The route by which polities seek such objectives can 
differ dramatically’ (Stone 2012, 485). While, with regard to our study, the long term goals 
between the EU and its member states and ASEAN and its member states might be similar 
with regard to counter terrorism or transnational organized crime, the selection and 
implementation of specific policies is largely contingent on domestic factors. That said even 
when policies are transferred successfully exogenously, policy implementation is essentially a 
contested process. Hence the domestic pushing and shoving which is part of any 
‘indigenization’ of the transfer of policy tends to alter its original goals and content. Thus, 
‘policies, models and ideas are not moved around like gifts at a birthday party or like jars on 
shelves, where the mobilization does not change the character and content of the mobilized 
objects’ (McCann 2011, 120). 
 
More so, the ‘demand side’ or the ‘norm taker’ (Acharya 2004) matters not only as a site of 
contestation during the implementation process of a particular policy, but as an agent who 
translates, interprets and ascribes meaning to policy models and policy ideas in the first place. 
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Coming from there, recent scholarship began to take issue with the (often implicit) positivist / 
rationalist assumptions underlying much of the previous scholarship on policy transfer, which 
have come to conceptualize ‘policy transfer’ as the practices of political elites to look for 
innovative policy elsewhere (coerced or voluntarily) and afterwards import those policies 
based on the assumption that they will provide for similar (successful) results in a different 
place (and often time) (Stone 1999; Dolowitz und Marsh 2000). Specifically it took issue with 
the implicit assumption, which also implicitly prevails in much of the literature on the 
externalization of EU policies (c.f. Heiduk 2014; Heiduk 2009; Kaunert und Léonard 2011; 
Chevallier-Govers 2012; Joffé 2008), that policy transfer or policy externalization is 
essentially undertaken by rational agents skimming policy innovations around the world for 
the objectively ‘best’, most successful policy to export, or, from the view of the demand side 
or the ‘policy taker’, to import.  
 
Influenced by Constructivism and Post-Structuralism, newer approaches have moved towards 
a research agenda which heavily focuses on the inter-subjective constitution of (policy) ideas, 
meanings, and knowledge. Freeman (2009) for example speaks of ‘translations’ rather than 
‘transfers’ of policies, during which series of interpretations and disruptions occur. From such 
a conceptual starting point “constraints” are not simply to be found with regard to different 
institutional set-ups, the high transaction costs of policy alteration, or resistance of entrenched 
elites, but social factors such as world views, identities, and cultural backgrounds all impact 
on the ‘translation’ of a policy on the side of the policy taker. As does an actor’s 
embeddedness in particular institutional contexts. To avoid the ‘literalist trap’ of assuming 
that ‘little happens to policies ‘along the way’, or ‘in the telling’’ (McCann 2011, 125), recent 
studies have paid increased attention to the process through which policies are translated, and 
successively re-embedded, in different social, economic and political contexts. In a similar 
vein the traditional approaches to policy transfer have been criticized as too 
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‘methodologically nationalist’ and state-centric due to their focus on policy transfers between 
nation-states. ‘Policy transfer and translation is just as likely to be achieved by mechanisms 
embedded in markets and networks as in the hierarchies of the state’ (Stone 2012, 490). 
Especially the concept of ‘policy translation’ lends itself well to elucidate the role of regional 
and international organizations as ‘policy intermediaries’, which add a further layer to the 
process in which ideas, meanings and interpretations of policies take and policies are 
subsequently modified and transformed (Stubbs und Lendvai 2007, 175). Hence not only 
resources and practices of the ‘policy innovator’ must be taken into consideration, but the 
‘policy taker’ must be acknowledged, too – not simply as the object of the policy transfer but 
as a subject that conditions the translation of policy. The conceptual point of departure of this 
paper is to view the externalization / transfer of policy not simply as the acts of rational actors 
freely skimming the world for the objectively best policy, but to take serious the crucial role 
of the policy taker as interpreter / translator of policy and its embeddedness in particular 
institutional legacies, norms, and established policy paradigms. 
 
 
Examining the policy taker: Policy making in ASEAN 
Examining the political rhetoric and terminology currently used by ASEAN certainly revokes 
connotations to the EU way of regional integration: ASEAN documents repeatedly speak of 
“regional integration” and the organization has, as part of the Bali Concord II in 2003, 
committed itself to build a “single market” as well as a “single production base” by the end of 
2015. Furthermore, a number of ASEAN institutions such as the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration or the Committee of Permanent Representatives have been modelled after similar 
EU institutions (Jetschke and Murray 2012; Murray and Moxon-Browne 2013). The 
ostensible convergence in political rhetoric and institutional design notwithstanding, ASEAN 
and the EU have traditionally pursued different paths of regional integration (Acharya 2000). 
The adoption of EU-coined rhetoric and institutions has not led to a convergence on a 
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common path towards regional integration. Whereas the EU’s integration process has been 
characterized by the pooling (of some degree) of national sovereignty, its institutionalization, 
and its legalistic character, the ASEAN integration process has been exclusively 
intergovernmental and characterized by the “ASEAN-way”  as a set of ideas and norms 
dissimilar to that inherent to the EU’s integration process. Central to the so-called ASEAN-
way are the notions of sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and non-interference among 
member states and to preserve regional autonomy. Article 2 of the ASEAN Treaty of Amity 
and Co-operation (TAC) states that it aims to espouse the independence and sovereignty of its 
members; the right of its members to exist without external interference; and non-interference 
in the internal affairs. In addition, article 13 calls for the resolution of conflicts between 
member states through non-violent, non-confrontational, friendly means. The roots of 
ASEAN’s informal, consensual, non-legalistic style of decision-making lie in the 
organizations’ initial focus on regional security. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and 
increasing tensions between neighboring states in the region,4 ASEAN’s primary raison d´etre 
was to ensure regional peace and stability, build trust between its members, minimize the 
influence of external powers and provide for regional solutions to regional problems.  
 
As Acharya has pointed out, the ASEAN-way as such “incorporates a set of well-known 
principles, e.g. non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other, non-use of force, pacific 
settlement of disputes, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states, 
that can be found in the Charter of the United Nations as well as regional political and 
security organizations elsewhere in the world“ (Acharya 1997, 329). Hence its code of 
conduct converges with international norms rather than to diverge away from them. Where 
                                                 
4 This relates specifically to the armed confrontations (“konfrontasi”) between Indonesia and Malaysia, but also 
tensions between Malaysia and the Philippines during the 1960s. 
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the ASEAN way actually diverges is with regard to the ‘operationalization’ of its code of 
conduct (Acharya 1997, 330). In order to preserve the member states’ sovereignty and to 
ensure non-intervention, ASEAN decision making rests on the principles of discussion and 
consultancy (musyawarah), consensus (mufakat), as well as a sense of community (gotong 
royong). Consensus is aimed for through consultation. Whilst this does not necessarily always 
have to entail unanimity, it certainly involves a consultation process which specifically 
focusses on the amalgation of the basic interests of all members. The heterogeneity of the ten 
member states in terms of their political systems, levels of economic development and their 
socio-cultural systems tends to draw out decision-making processes and often results in the 
lowest common denominator. ASEAN’s primary mode of activity hereby is inter-
governmental meetings among the representatives of the ten member states. Hence the 
organization disposes of a sense of shared purpose based around a set of core norms (the 
“ASEAN way”). As such these norms are more than mere talking points; they have developed 
into uniformly held norms which socialized the member states into a specific modus operandi 
of policy-making at the regional level for over 40 years.  
 
Fast forward to 2015, more than 40 years after the signing of the Bangkok Declaration which 
led to the founding of ASEAN, and the ASEAN-way remains central to ASEAN’s internal 
modus operandi. More so, its genuine sense of a regional political identity also manifests 
itself in ASEAN’s relations with the rest of the world. ASEAN has been active, much like the 
EU, in promoting its very own modus operandi in its external affairs. It has been successful to 
socialize its many of its neighbors, including China, Japan and Australia, into ASEAN-led 
multilateral dialogue forums such as the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum) or the East-Asia 
Summit. The ASEAN hereby provides the normative foundations for these multilateral 
dialogue forums and has left a mark on operational procedures in that they attain to 
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consensual decision-making, high levels of informality and a rejection of institutionalized 
forms of cooperation (Dosch 2012). 
 
EU-ASEAN cooperation in the area of Non-Traditional Security (NTS) 
The EU’s relations with ASEAN from ASEAN foundation in 1967 until the 1990s were 
marked by the absence of an institutional framework, consisting of informal contact between 
European and Southeast Asian states. Hence the relations between the two regions have 
traditionally been characterized as almost exclusively dominated by economic concerns with 
little concerns for security cooperation (Robles Jr. 2006; Umbach 2008; Wong 2012; Holmes 
2013). A beginning formalization of the relations between the EU and ASEAN only 
commenced after the end of the Cold War. The 1994’s EU’s Asia Strategy (‘Toward a new 
Asia Strategy’) defined Asia as a strategically important region and identified a number of 
policy areas for closer cooperation, i.e. poverty reduction and environmental protection, but 
was still mainly dominated by economic aspects (European Commission 2003). The 
beginning institutionalization of the EU’s relations with Asia also led to the establishment of 
ASEM (Asia Europe Meetings) in 1996 – an informal forum for ad hoc dialogues on the 
ministerial level which also holds bi-annual meetings of the heads of states. 
 
It wasn’t until the 2002 Bali bombings, which cost the lives of 49 EU citizens, that security 
concerns, specifically transnational terrorism, made it on to the EU-ASEAN agenda. This 
resulted in an EU-ASEAN “Joint Declaration to Combat Terrorism” in 2003 which called for 
closer cooperation between Europe and Southeast Asia (European Union 2003a). 2003 also 
saw the publication of the EU’s first ASEAN strategy paper (“A new partnership with 
Southeast Asia”), which listed “the fight against terrorism” and “mainstreaming JHA” as 
strategic priorities of the EU (European Commission 2003). It is hereby stated that human 
rights aspects and democratic governance “should be promoted in all aspects of policy 
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dialogue and development cooperation, through building constructive partnerships with 
ASEAN and national governments based on dialogue, encouragement and effective support” 
(European Commission 2003, 3). 
 
The broadening of the EU’s agenda with regard to ASEAN also touched upon more general 
strategic documents, such as the EU’s “A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA: Global 
Freedom, Security and Justice” published in 2005. The document explicitly refers to the Bali 
bombings as its point of reference for calling for an intensification of international counter 
terrorism cooperation (Council of the European Union 2005). The aforementioned documents, 
however, while formalizing EU-ASEAN relations, did not venture beyond non-binding, very 
general letters of intent with regard to closer cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. 
2007’s “Nuremberg Declaration” refined the strategic priorities laid out in the “New 
partnership with Southeast Asia” and established “political and security cooperation“ as one 
of its five inter-regional areas for closer co-operation. The section on “political and security 
cooperation” states that EU and ASEAN aim for “… closer cooperation in addressing and 
combating terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, sea piracy, arms 
smuggling, money laundering, cyber-crime and related trans-national crime…” (European 
Commission 2007a, 3). Besides this, its relevance with regard to the focus of this paper lies 
with the accompanying “Plan of Action” (PoA) intent to implement the “Nuremberg 
Declaration” between 2007 – 2012 (European Commission 2007b). For the first time the non-
binding letters of intent to be found in previous were to be accompanied by a PoA which lists 
concrete policy measures to be implemented. Upon its expiry in 2012, the EU-ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting in Brunei released a new PoA for the years 2013-2017 (European 
Commission 2012).  
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Both PoA’s consist of stated objectives and planned activities, which by and large draw on 
facilitating (and deepening) political dialogue, the exchange of best practices and, to a lesser 
extent, capacity building. While a range of workshops, seminars and visits to EU institutions 
is listed in the annex of the 2007-2012 PoA, none of these activities are directly linked to 
issues such as counter terrorism or human trafficking. Instead the listed activities in the 
annexes include, amongst others, a seminar on anti-personnel landmines and a workshop on 
small arms and light weapons. More so, with regard to the political dialogues mentioned in 
the PoA’s, the PoA’s do not foresee the creation of new interregional dialogue forums, but 
refer to previously established forums in the context of the EU-ASEAN Ministerial meetings, 
forums at UN level and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). For example with regard to 
human trafficking the 2007-2012 PoA calls for the support of “ASEAN’s efforts, where 
practicable, in combating trafficking in persons through existing programmes, projects or 
activities and intensify cooperation between ASEAN and EU with regard to supporting the 
ASEAN Declaration against Trafficking in Persons particularly Women and Children, 
recommendations of SOMTC Work Programme on Trafficking in Persons, the ASEAN Plan 
of Action for Cooperation on Immigration Matters and, when appropriate, the Palermo 
Convention and its protocols” (European Commission 2007b, 3). Similarly, the document 
calls for “support the implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism and 
promote the full and effective implementation of the UN Security Council’s Resolutions 
related to terrorism as well as ratification or accession, as the case may be, and 
implementation of the international conventions relating to counter terrorism and relevant 
resolutions of the United Nations on measures aimed at countering international terrorism, 
including assisting ASEAN Member Countries in capacity building” (European Commission 
2007b, 2). 
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The PoA for the years 2013 – 2017 is for the most part extending measures and activities 
listed in the first PoA. The main focus is again on dialogue forums and the exchange of best 
practices through formats such as seminars and workshops. Hereby it is again the ARF that is 
deemed the central forum for security affairs. In the 2013 – 2017 PoA technical assistance 
takes up more room as the EU aims to support newly created ASEAN institutions such as the 
Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), the Southeast Asia Regional 
Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) and the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA). The PoA also sets out the implementation of an ASEAN-EU Comprehensive Border 
Management Programme with the aim of improving border management in ASEAN member 
states. Additionally the document, in contrast with its predecessor aims to explore  “…the 
establishment of a regular policy dialogue on counter terrorism” (European Commission 
2012, 2).  
 
To be sure, the aforementioned declarations and plan of actions have established a range of 
new forums for soft forms of policy transfer through information exchange, sharing of best 
practices, and capacity building, such as various dialogue fora (Senior Official Meetings, Joint 
Committees), partnership agreements, joint action plans and strategy papers. More so, the 
Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership 
(2013-2017) integrated fighting terrorism as well as human trafficking amongst its priorities. 
However, while the newly established forums theoretically open up space for the transfer of 
ideas, best practices and policies, they do not fall on some sort of terra nullius. The following 
examination of the assumed policy taker (ASEAN) shows that ASEAN had various intra-
regional agreements and policy guidelines established in the respective policy fields which 
pre-date the Nuremberg declaration from 2007 by a decade.  
 
ASEAN and the fight against transnational organized crime 
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A 2006 report by ASEAN summarizes ASEAN’s response to human trafficking as, broadly 
speaking, driven by the respective national criminal justice systems. It also states that: “This 
focus is not meant to detract from other important responses to trafficking, such as prevention 
activities and the reintegration of victims. It does, however, reflect a growing acceptance of 
the key role that criminal justice agencies must play, at both the national and regional levels, 
in the fight against trafficking.” The measures listed on the report to implement such a 
criminal justice response effectively within Southeast Asia are the sharing of expertise and 
experience by the respective national agencies bilaterally and at the regional level; the 
development of mutual legal assistance and extradition treaties; ensuring coherence of the 
individual member states’ approaches to human trafficking with international norms 
established by the UN Trafficking Protocol; and the harmonization of donor efforts at the 
national level amongst others (ASEAN 2006, 86). Thus intergovernmental policy 
harmonization, rather than regional integration, can be deduced as the modus operandi in 
ASEAN’s fight against transnational crime and human trafficking. Thus it incorporates key 
tenets of the ASEAN way such as non-intervention and absolute respect for the national 
sovereignty of the other member states. 
  
It is the outcome of more than ten year old policy process which dates back to the mid-1990s. 
At that time human trafficking and terrorism were, amongst other areas of concern, bundled 
together under the umbrella term “Transnational Organized Crime (TOC)” before evolving 
into single areas of concern in the 2000s (ASEAN 1997a). In 1997 the member states signed 
the “ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime” in Manila, including a section on human 
trafficking, in which the member states agreed to ‘strengthen cooperation at the regional 
level’; ‘to convene an ASEAN Ministeral Meeting on Transnational Crime’, and to ‘hold 
discussion (…) about bilateral and regional agreements on issues such as mutual legal 
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assistance’ (ASEAN 1997b). At the ASEAN level cooperation at senior level takes place 
through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime while senior officials 
cooperate through the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC). 
At ensuing AMMTC’s (ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime) awareness of 
transnational crime grew and it was decidedly regarded as an issue of concern for the stability 
of the states in the region and for economic prosperity (ASEAN 1999). All of this, however, 
was clad into a non-binding language in line with ASEAN’s key norms of non-intervention 
and national sovereignty. The aforementioned “Manila declaration” for example stressed 
“regional action” by, amongst other measures, “harmonizing, as appropriate, existing laws” 
(ASEAN 1997b). Activities listed in the “ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime” include: information exchange; the harmonization of national policies; best practice 
exchanges between national law enforcement agencies; strengthening regional capabilities to 
fight transnational criminal activities; and the establishment of the ASEAN Center for 
Combating Transnational Crime (ASEAN 1998).  
 
This is not to say that attempts towards a more formalized approach, including legally binding 
regional agreements, were not made. Former Secretary-Generals, as well as certain member 
states such as Thailand or the Philippines, have at various time called for more regional 
integration. Within the inherent tension between ASEAN’s sacrosanct norms on the one hand 
(the “ASEAN-way”), and the need for increased regional cooperation if not integration when 
faced with transnational issues on the other, the pendulum constantly swung in the direction 
of the ASEAN way. The 2004 “ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons” 
reaffirmed the inter-governmental approach inherent to the preceding declarations and 
agreements. It states that ASEAN member states will fight human trafficking “to the extent 
permitted by their respective domestic laws and policies” (ASEAN 2004) thus reiterating 
ASEAN’s sacrosanct norms of non-intervention and absolute national sovereignty. This 
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approach is reaffirmed in the ASEAN Handbook on international legal cooperation in cases of 
human trafficking, too (ASEAN 2010). It has also become the dominant modus operandi in 
ASEAN-driven multilateral cooperation such as ASEAN+3 (China, S. Korea, and Japan), 
ASEAN+6 (India, Australia and New Zealand), the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), the East 
Asia Summit and the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and related 
Transnational Crime. 
 
A similar picture emerges when one examines ASEAN’s counter terrorism efforts. Article 3 
of ASEAN’s convention on counter terrorism launched in 2007 states that: “The Parties shall 
carry out their obligations under this Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of 
sovereign equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other Parties”. Article 4 reiterates the “ASEAN-way” further by stating that: 
“Nothing in this Convention entitles a Party to undertake, in the territory of another Party, the 
exercise of jurisdiction or performance of functions which are exclusively reserved for the 
authorities of that other Party by its domestic laws” (ASEAN 2007). The measures to 
implement ASEAN’s counter terrorism conventions include the promotion of capacity 
building through regional meetings; cross-border cooperation; intelligence and information 
sharing; and to overall strengthen the capabilities and the readiness of the respective member 
state agencies to deal with all forms of terrorism (ASEAN 2007). Regional counter terrorism 
thus has rested predominantly on enhancing national capabilities rather than building up 
institutions at the regional level. Like the ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime, 
a regional body on counter terrorism has not progressed beyond the “talk-shop” mode. Hence 
ASEAN’s approach has been aptly described in a report as: ‘Cooperation in fighting terrorism 
in Southeast Asia has largely been limited to bilateral or trilateral efforts, involving only a few 
of the ten ASEAN countries. As an organization, ASEAN has made numerous statements and 
adopted many declarations about its intentions to prevent and combat terrorism. Its members 
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have a mixed record, however, in incorporating these decisions or commitments into their 
respective national legislation or practice’ (Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation 
2007, 7). 
 
ASEAN’s approach to counter terrorism is the outcome of a more than decade old policy 
process which goes back to the aforementioned Manila Declaration on Transnational Crime in 
1997, which name terrorism as one of the transnational crime issues Southeast Asian states 
should be most concerned with. The areas laid out for intensified regional cooperation were 
intelligence sharing, extradition, law enforcement cooperation, airport security and the 
creation of national anti-terrorism units. However, cooperation essentially remained at the 
level of declarations of the willingness of member states to work together to combat terrorism. 
The necessity to adopt a regional approach to counter terrorism gained new impetus after 9/11 
when ASEAN leaders issued the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism in 
late 2001. In a move to formulate a specific regional position towards to U.S.-led “Global 
War on Terror”, which was at the time well underway with a military operation against the 
Taliban, the declaration defines ASEAN’s approach by rejecting any attempts to link 
terrorism with any race or religion as well as by stressing the importance of the UN charter 
and associated norms: ‘…efforts to counter terrorism must be conducted in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations, and all of its relevant resolutions’. The latter signifies the 
centrality of the UN multilateral framework on counter terrorism as ASEAN’s primary point 
of reference for regional as well as international counter terrorism cooperation. The 
declaration also calls for the ‘strengthening of national mechanisms to combat terrorism’ and 
to ‘deepen cooperation among our front-line law enforcement agencies in combatting 
terrorism and sharing best practices’ (ASEAN 2001). It did not, however, mark a break with 
the Association’s well established principles of non-intervention and absolute respect for 
national sovereignty. Subsequent declarations adopted after the terror attacks in Bali 2002 and 
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Jakarta 2005, as well as communiques by the AMMTC on counter terrorism, have mainly 
echoed established positions without introducing any deeper cooperative, or even 
integrationist, measures (Emmers 2009).  
 
In efforts to deepen regional collaboration, military intelligence directors of Malaysia, 
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Brunei have held a number of informal meetings to 
discuss intelligence sharing to counter Southeast Asia’s main transnational terrorist network 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Under the guise of Interpol the police chiefs of numerous ASEAN 
member states have exchanged best practices and experiences in counter terrorism measures. 
And ASEAN foreign ministers also discussed regional collaboration efforts against terrorism 
at a number of meetings. Nonetheless, the implementation of counter terrorism measures 
highlighted by ASEAN such as intelligence sharing has taken place bilaterally and trilaterally 
between various member states. An example is the Anti-Terrorism Pact signed by Malaysia, 
Indonesia and the Philippines in an effort to bolster cooperation in the fight against terrorism. 
Thailand, Brunei and Cambodia later joined the pact (Ramakrishna 2006).  
 
ASEAN’s collective emphases on inter-governmental approaches to counter terrorism is also 
discernible in the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) endorsed at the Bali Summit 2003, 
where a proposal for a plan of action on counter terrorism calling for the establishment of a 
ASEAN peacekeeping force, a counter terrorism center and the promotion of democracy and 
human rights by Indonesia was rejected. The proposal had included measures such as the 
promotion of human rights, which in the eyes of member states like Vietnam and Myanmar 
would have related to their own domestic affairs and thus infringed on their national 
sovereignty. This non-binding agreement, like its predecessors, gives national laws 
precedence over the numerous regional provisions mentioned in the ASC agreement. This 
resulted in a what was described as a ‘watered down version’ of the plan of action, which ‘no 
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longer included the idea of introducing more flexible application of the non-interference 
principle’ (Emmers 2009, 172). Likewise the key principles of the ASEAN way, which date 
back to the 1970s, have been introduced into ASEAN’s counter terrorism cooperation with 
external actors such as the joint declarations on counter terrorism with the U.S., Australia or 
the EU. ASEAN’s role as the norm exporter into multilateral forums is exemplified in the 
ARF “Statement on Strengthening Transport Security against International Terrorism” which 
stresses ‘the need to respect independence, sovereign equality and territorial integrity of 
states, the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of states and non-use of force 
or threat of force’ (ASEAN Regional Forum 2004). 
 
Hence the ASEAN policy processes on human trafficking and counter terrorism, consisting of 
a reoccurring circle of pledges and meetings as well as non-binding declarations and 
communiques, underline the much-derided ASEAN way as the organizations modus operandi. 
Regional institutions are noticeably weak or absent, as the failure to establish the planned 
ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime indicates. Instead, ASEAN’s efforts are 
focused on policy harmonization across its members, thereby prioritizing the responsibility of 
the individual member states and resulting in closer inter-state bilateral and trilateral 
cooperation to tackle issues related to human trafficking and terrorism.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper’s conceptual starting point was to understand any externalization or transfer of 
policy as not simply as a choice made by rational actors browsing for the ‘best’ policy, but 
pay attention to the embeddedness, especially of the proposed policy taker, within sets of 
particular norms, institutional legacies and long-held policy paradigms. In contrast to much of 
the existing literature on policy externalization by the EU we have diverted our analytical 
focus away from Brussels and towards the norms and modus operandi of ASEAN to answer 
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the question why, despite rhetorical commitments to greater cooperation between the two 
regional organizations and the EU being often considered a model and source of inspiration 
for ASEAN, cooperation in the field of non-traditional security remains very much in its 
infancy.   
 
On the basis of tracing the policy development in ASEAN in the respective policy fields, the 
paper argues that any attempts by external actors such as the EU to externalize their policy to 
ASEAN is subsequently confronted by long-standing norms, policy paradigms and a specific 
modus operandi (often summarized under the label “ASEAN way”), which make nigh 
impossible any externalization of EU policies to Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. 
Hence even where we find a (gradual) adoption of EU coined political rhetoric or similarities 
in institutional design this is not to be equated with policy convergence.  
The ASEAN way, with its focus on sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, regional 
autonomy and non-interference among member states has socialized the member states into a 
an strictly intergovernmental, non-legalistic, informal modus operandi which diverges 
strongly from the pooling of national sovereignty, the institutionalization and the legally-
binding character of European integration. 
 
To be sure, the relations between the EU and ASEAN have developed from an almost 
exclusively economic focus to the incorporation of new forums (Senior Official Meetings, 
Joint Committees) as well as joint declarations and joint plans of actions. And issues such as 
counter terrorism or human trafficking have been integrated into the inter-regional agenda. 
However, while these forums certainly open up space for the transfer of ideas, best practices 
and policies, any such transfer from the EU to ASEAN has been heavily constrained by 
ASEAN’s particular modus operandi. Coming from there, we can furthermore assume that 
changes on the institutional level of the EU’s cooperation with ASEAN, such as the recent 
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appointment of an EU Ambassador dedicated to ASEAN, will not significantly alter our 
findings for the foreseeable future. Moreover, we can tacitly assume on the basis of our 
findings that it has been ASEAN, rather than the EU, who has been successful in transferring 
its norms and specific modus operandi into its external relations with Europe (amongst others) 
as the ASEAN-way provides the fundament of a number of multilateral dialogue forums, 
amongst them ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting), in which ASEAN, at least formally, sits in the 
driver’s seat (Sukma 2010).  
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